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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the modern theory of social cost-bene￿t analysis in
a dynamic economy. The theory emphasizes the role of a comprehensive, forward-
looking, dynamic welfare index within the period of the project rather than that
of a project￿ s long-term consequences. However, what constitutes such a welfare
index remains controversial in the recent literature. In this paper, we attempt to
shed light on the issue by deriving three equivalent cost-bene￿t rules for evaluating a
small project. In particular, we show that the direct change in net national product
(NNP) quali￿es as a convenient welfare index without involving any other induced
side e⁄ects. The project evaluation criterion thus becomes the present discounted
value of the direct changes in NNP over the project period. We also illustrate the
application of this theory in a few stylized examples.
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11 Introduction
In the economics literature, it is well-known that the criterion function for social-
cost bene￿t analysis of investment projects should be the present discounted value
of future social pro￿ts (cf. Dasgupta et al., 1972; Little and Mirrlees, 1974; DrŁze
and Stern, 1987). However, the exact constituents of social pro￿ts depend largely on
the characteristics of the particular project under consideration. While earlier studies
from the 1970s deal mainly with the ￿second-best￿constraints (with disequilibrium),
the recent literature is directed more towards environmental problems related to the
concept of sustainable development1. As most environmental issues, such as global
climate change, biodiversity loss, and nuclear waste disposal, are likely to have a
long-run impact on human welfare, dynamic models with an in￿nite time horizon are
often used as a theoretical basis.
The change in emphasis from the ￿second-best￿constraints to environmental con-
cerns has also led to a paradigm shift in theorizing social cost-bene￿t rules. Instead of
valuing a project￿ s lifetime consequences, the modern theory of dynamic social cost-
bene￿t analysis places greater emphasis on the role of a ￿nite, forward-looking welfare
index for project evaluations. Through the lens of accounting prices, the welfare index
equipped with a component of net investment would be able to capture even starting
from its ￿implementation￿stage, the complete contribution of the project over the
entire future. As such, the evaluation criterion becomes the present discounted value
(PDV) of the welfare index numbers over the project period, thus removing the need
to explicitly predict the cost-bene￿t consequences over the entire future. If a project
leads to a larger PDV of the index numbers, it will be considered socially pro￿table
from an e¢ ciency point of view.
A di⁄erent, but closely related problem is to measure sustainable development
using the same type of dynamic welfare index. As long as the index numbers do not
decline over time, the prevailing social well-being will be sustainable (cf. Weitzman,
2001; Li an L￿fgren, 2006). In an abstract sense, dynamic social cost-bene￿t analysis
and sustainability measurement deal with essentially the same problem, if the elapse
of time in the latter case is regarded as a ￿project￿ . Any increase in the index
1See Aronsson and L￿fgren (1998; 1999); Asheim (2000), Dasgupta et al. (1995; 1997); Dasgupta
and M￿ler (2000); and Weitzman (2000; 2001).
2numbers, caused either by an intentionally implemented project or simply by the
time momentum, would indicate a welfare improvement. However, when it comes
to details, di⁄erences may emerge due to the nature of the ￿project￿ types. For
sustainability measurement, the time ￿project￿moves along a single direction only.
On the other hand, in cost bene￿t analysis, an intentional project may involve a
multi-dimensional change in the economy such as the introduction of direct policy
reforms and public investments as well as their induced side e⁄ects. The problems
associated with such multi-dimensional causes and e⁄ects may, thus, merit further
exploration.
It is, today, well-known that the current-value Hamiltonian is a theoretically cor-
rect dynamic welfare index (Weitzman, 1976, 2003). However, how the concept should
be operationalized within the framework of cost-bene￿t analysis has been the subject
of controversy in the recent literature (cf. Asheim, 2000; Dasgupta et al., 1994, 1997;
Dasgupta and M￿ler, 2000; Weitzman, 2000). Firstly, should it be de￿ned as a utility-
based, presumably nonlinear Hamiltonian function or as a linearized version in the
form of a money-metric net national product.? Secondly, concerning its composition,
what e⁄ects should count? If we consider the case of a small public investment project
this may involve direct changes in consumption, investment and capital, as well as
inducing some secondary, indirect e⁄ects on the economy as a whole. Which of these
e⁄ects should we take into account in evaluating the project? Should we include all
possible e⁄ects or just a subset of them, say the direct e⁄ects? Is it necessary to have
a cost-of-holding capital term in the index?
The present paper attempts to clarify these issues by deriving three dynamic cost-
bene￿t rules that all produce the correct answer for evaluating small projects2. We
use Ockham￿ s razor3 to pick the most convenient rule, the one that retains the direct
e⁄ects on NNP only. After presenting the model setup in section 2, we show in
section 3 that it is correct to estimate the present value of all the direct and indirect
e⁄ects on consumption over the in￿nite horizon. Thereafter, we show that another
way to measure the change in welfare is to use the present value of the change in
the net social pro￿t4, including both the direct and indirect e⁄ects on consumption
2The choice of evaluating small projects motivates our use of di⁄erential techniques.
3￿Entities must not be multiplied beyond what is necessary￿ .
4A term coined by Dixit et. al. (1980).
3and capital formation, evaluated over the period of the only. Lastly, the envelope
properties enable us to get rid of all indirect e⁄ects, including the cost-of-holding-
capital term. The ￿nal evaluation criterion becomes, conveniently, the present value
of the changes in NNP during the project period. We also illustrate the application
of this theory using a few stylized examples in section 4. Section 5 sums up the study.
2 A Multi-Sector Conditional Optimal Growth Model
In order to derive our dynamic cost-bene￿t rule in its most general form, we consider a
multi-sector growth model with all possible consumption and investment goods taken
into account. Let C = (C1;C2;:::;Cm) be a m-dimensional vector of consumption
￿ ows at a given time t, which is supposed to exhaust all possible goods and services
that are relevant to social welfare or to the standard of living of a representative
individual. In addition to the usual market commodities, environmental services
such as forest amenities, biodiversity and ecosystem functions, in ￿ ow terms, are also
considered to be part of the consumption vector. This means that the prices of these
services are rental prices. The utilitarian measure of intertemporal welfare at time





where U(C) is a given concave, non-decreasing, instantaneous utility function with
continuous second order derivatives de￿ned for C ￿ 0, and ￿ is the utility rate of
discount. Let K = (K1;K2;:::;Kn) be a vector of capital goods, which is assumed to
contain all types of capital goods in the economy. Net investments are, by de￿nition,
the change in capital stocks, i.e. Ii = _ Ki, i = 1;2;:::;n, which in a vector form can
be expressed as
I = _ K, given K(0) = K0 > 0 (2)
At each point in time t, consumption C(t) and investment I(t) are allocated
within the (m + n)-dimensional attainable-possibility set S (K(t);￿), conditional on
a collection of parameters (cf. DrŁze and Stern, 1987), ￿, such that
(C(t);I(t)) 2 S (K(t);￿) (3)
4which is assumed to be strictly convex. The parameters ￿ may represent any premise
that modi￿es the feasible set for consumption and investment allocations. This in-
cludes aspects such as a given property right regime, a given taxation system, or
an inherent public infrastructure, which are normally not optimized in the economic
system. Conditional on the parameters, the social planner is assumed to maximize
the current-value Hamiltonian at each point in time t,
H(t) = U (C(t)) + ￿(t)I(t) (4)
with respect to fC(t);I(t)g subject to (3), where ￿(t) is the n-dimensional vector
of the utility shadow prices (co-state variables) of capital satisfying the following
equation of motion





￿(t) means evaluation along the optimal trajectory at time t.
Note that the feasible set for the optimization problem S (K(t);￿) contains a
collection of governance parameters in addition to the resource constraints. Thus,
the optimal trajectory of consumption, investment and capital also depends on the
parameters ￿. In other words, the solution paths for these variables are conditional
optimum paths. Let fC￿(￿;t);I￿(￿;t);K￿(￿;t)g denote the conditional optimum








At each point in time t, the maximized current-value Hamiltonian is given by
H











where P￿(￿;t) = rU(C￿(￿;t))=￿(t) and Q￿(￿;t) = ￿(￿;t)=￿(t) are, respectively,
the money price vectors of consumption and investment at time t, with ￿(t) as the
corresponding marginal utility of income. This completes the background description
required for deriving the dynamic cost-bene￿t rules.
5Since the consumption vector exhaust all for well-being relevant goods and services and the
investment vector involves all types of productive capital stocks including environmental assets, the
concept of NNP here is meant to be comprehensive NNP.
53 The dynamic cost-bene￿t rule for a small policy reform
Now, we address the dynamic cost-bene￿t rules for evaluating a small project, say,
a small policy reform. Given that the parameters ￿ set a premise for the dynamic
optimization problem, we are concerned about the welfare e⁄ect of a change in these
parameters. Let us consider a policy reform with a small change, d￿, from reference
level ￿0 during the period [0;T]. This may cause changes in consumption and in-
vestment both within the project and the post-project period. Without any loss of
generality, let us consider a small public investment project. The aim of the cost-
bene￿t analysis is to evaluate whether or not the resulting change, over time, in the
stream of consumption and investment values time is welfare improving.
According to the discounted utilitarian theory, the reform d￿ is socially pro￿table
if it increases utility wealth as de￿ned in (6), i.e. dW ￿
0(￿) = @W ￿
0(￿)=@￿ ￿ d￿ > 0,
evaluated at ￿ = ￿0. However, as utility wealth is not directly observable by the
social planner, it will prove useful to ￿nd a monetary alternative that can provide
the same ranking in project evaluations (cf Aronsson et al, 2004). Under certain
regularity conditions concerning the value function in (6), the e⁄ect of a reform d￿




















where dC(t) = @C(t)=@￿ ￿ d￿ denotes the total e⁄ect on the vector of consumption
at time t ￿ 0. The second equality is due to the ￿rst-order condition rU(C￿(t)) =
￿(t)P￿(t) from a dynamic competitive equilibrium (Dixit et al, 1980). The third
equality follows from the Euler equation linking the pure rate of time preference ￿
to the money rate of discount r(￿), i.e. _ ￿(￿) = ￿(￿)(r(￿) ￿ ￿). The solution can
be written as ￿(t)e￿￿t = ￿(0)exp(￿
R t
0 r(￿)d￿). Since ￿(0) > 0 is an arbitrary scale
parameter, we can, without loss of generality, normalize it to unity, and propose the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 The e⁄ect of a small policy reform, d￿, over a period t 2 [0;T], on
the utility wealth W ￿
0(￿) is completely captured by the change in the present discounted










Although equation (10) represents the theoretically correct criterion for social
cost-bene￿t analysis of a small project, there are practical di¢ culties in its appli-
cation. First, the e⁄ect on consumption at each point in time involves all ￿general
equilibrium￿e⁄ects on the whole economy; and, second, the social planner has to
evaluate all such e⁄ects over an in￿nite time horizon. Consider a small hypothetical
bridge project that requires both labor and timber inputs, and which would cause
a direct change in consumption in terms of foregone leisure. Once constructed, the
bridge would also generate transport services that would induce further changes in
the economy. In addition, the timber exacted from the forest for the construction of
the bridge would also a⁄ect the growth of the remaining trees as well as the forest
amenities. This would, in turn, induce further changes in the rest of the economy. In
practice, to predict all such e⁄ects over an in￿nite time horizon would be very di¢ cult,
if not impossible. In the quest of an operational version of the dynamic cost-bene￿t
rule, we rewrite the optimal value function, in the same spirit as in Leonard (1987)






















where ￿￿(￿;t) is the vector of utility shadow prices per unit of capital stocks at time
t, conditional on ￿ = ￿0.
Note also that by allowing the parameter vector ￿ to directly enter the utility
function U(C(￿;s);￿), we can model a direct perturbation of consumption as a part
of the reform d￿. To ￿x ideas, we may specify the utility function as U = U(C(￿;s)+
￿(￿)) with ￿(￿) = 0 for the pre-project case at ￿ = ￿0. A direct e⁄ect of the
reform, d￿, would be @U(C(￿;s);￿)=@￿ = @U(C(￿;s);￿)=@C ￿ @￿(￿)=@￿ and all
other indirect e⁄ects on utility would be re￿ ected through @C(￿;s)=@￿. Presumably,
the number of non-zero elements of @￿=@￿ for a small project is much fewer than
the total dimension of the complete consumption vector. For the hypothetical bridge
7example mentioned above, the only direct e⁄ect on consumption is the reduction in
leisure time, though the indirect e⁄ects may involve all possible general equilibrium
adjustments triggered by the transport service of the new bridge. In certain cases,
where the project does not involve a direct change in the consumption vector, we
would have @￿=@￿ = 0.
By taking the total di⁄erential of the optimal value function in (11) with respect









￿(t)￿K(t)] ￿ ￿(t) ￿ e
￿￿tdt (12)
where Q￿(t) = ￿￿(t)=￿(t) and R￿(t) =
h
_ ￿(￿;t) ￿ ￿￿(￿;t)
i
=￿(t) are the money
prices of investment and capital rentals, respectively, and the expressions ￿C(t) =
(@C￿=@￿ + @￿=@￿)d￿, ￿K(t) = @K(t)=@￿ ￿ d￿, and ￿I(t) = (@I=@C ￿ @C=@￿ +
@I=@K ￿ @K=@￿ + @I=@￿)d￿ denote, respectively, the total change in consumption,
capital and investment at time t (See Appendix for more details). Note that the
expression P￿(t)￿C(t) + Q￿(t)￿I(t) + R￿(t)￿K(t) in (12) is the well-known version
of social pro￿t (Dixit et al., 1980). Now, by using the Euler equation _ ￿(t) = ￿(t)(r(t)￿





0r(￿)d￿) with the initial marginal utility of income ￿(0) normalized to
unity. This leads to the following widely accepted form of the dynamic cost-bene￿t
rule (cf. Dasgupta 2001, Arrow et al., 2003).
Proposition 2 Consider a small policy reform, d￿, over a period [0,T], which would
lead to changes in consumption, investment, and capital stocks within the project
period by f￿C(t);￿I(t);￿K(t)g
T
0. The project is socially pro￿table if the present








0r(￿)d￿)dt > 0 (13)
What is the relationship between the dynamic cost-bene￿t rule (13) and the cost
bene￿t rule in (10) derived in Proposition 1? It can readily be shown that they are
two sides of the same coin. The rationale behind this is that the second and the third



























This expression6 corresponds to the optimal value change at the end of the project
period (in present value terms) resulting from the reform in period t 2 [0;T]; i.e.,




0 r(￿)d￿). This is the present discounted value
of future changes in consumption given by7 R 1
T P￿(t)dC(t)exp(￿
R t
0 r(￿)d￿)dt. Now it
can be seen that, while the integral of the ￿rst term in (13) measures the within-period
welfare e⁄ects, the integral of the last two terms over the project period t 2 [0;T]
measures the welfare e⁄ects over the whole post-project period from time T onwards.
The sum of these e⁄ects becomes exactly the same as the expression in equation (10)
in Proposition 1.
Next, by using the same ￿rst-order necessary conditions for the within-project-
period t 2 [0;T], @U￿=@C + ￿￿@I￿=@C = 0 and S￿ = _ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ = ￿@H￿=@K, along
the conditional optimal trajectory with a given ￿ = ￿0, we can simplify the Dixit
et al￿ s (1980) social pro￿t expression in (13) to obtain our dynamic envelope result.
After having canceled all the indirect e⁄ects on consumption, investment, and capital
stocks, what is left in the integrand of (13) is the variation in the comprehensive net
national product as anticipated by Dasgupta et al (1995) and Dasgupta and M￿ler
(1997). The simpli￿ed dynamic cost bene￿t rule from (13) can then be expressed as
Proposition 3 Consider a small policy reform, d￿, over the interval [0;T], which
would lead to a direct perturbation in consumption and investment with d~ C(t) =
@￿(￿;t)
@￿ d￿ and d~ I(t) =
@I(￿)
@￿ d￿, respectively. We measure the change in the present











6Note that ￿K(t) = 0 at t = 0, since the initial stocks K(0) are given.











9If this change is positive, the project is socially pro￿table8; if it is negative, the project
is socially unpro￿table.
This clear-cut, dynamic cost-bene￿t rule may greatly facilitate practical cost-
bene￿t analysis of small projects. This rule only requires information about the
direct e⁄ect of the reform without any need to trace all the general equilibrium ef-
fects. In Dreze and Stern￿ s (1987) terms, the dynamic cost-bene￿t rule stated in (15)
is based on an evaluation of the reform parameters or instruments, and does not re-
quire the consequences of the reform or the general equilibrium e⁄ects. After having
canceled out all indirect e⁄ects, what remains in the integrand of the integral in (15)
is exactly the variation in (comprehensive) NNP caused by the reform! In addition,
the social planner only needs to evaluate the e⁄ects within the project period, since
the consumption e⁄ects over the post-project period have already been taken into
account by the change in the value of investment within the project period.
Compared with Dasgupta and M￿ler (2000) who claimed that the money NNP
can only be used for evaluating an instant project with capital stock kept intact, our
dynamic cost-bene￿t rule in (15) is more general. We have shown that the money
NNP is a perfect instantaneous linear welfare index for evaluating a more realistic
project. Rather than imposing that the capital must to be intact, we allow it to
change over time as indicated in (13). The reason why the capital cost term vanishes
in (15) is that the cost of holding capital is exactly o⁄set by the bene￿t it would
have generated. It is worth mentioning, however, that this is generally only true
along a ￿rst-best-like, conditional optimum path. The underlying assumption is that
households and ￿rms would be optimizing agents within the given non-optimized
premises, which the project is supposed to change. Otherwise, as shown by Aronsson
et. al (1997), changes in stocks will appear in cost-bene￿t rules when the economy
contains other market imperfections.
8In other words, a generalized version of Fisher￿ s Separation Theorem holds (cf Aronsson and
L￿fgren, 1999). For cost bene￿t rules under externalities, see Johansson and L￿fgren (1997) and
Aronsson et al (1997, 1998).
104 Illustration and interpretations
In this section, we illustrate our theory by means of a few stylized examples. The
￿rst example attempts to give a sense of what the direct, indirect, short and long-
run e⁄ects could be, and how our envelope results would simplify the evaluation of
the project. The model employed for this purpose is a modi￿ed Ramsey model with
a non-diminishing rate of capital productivity, and our "project" is an exogenous
change in the productivity parameter during a ￿nite period of time. The second
one is based the Brock (1977) growth model, where environmental quality enters the
utility function. The ￿nal example is of an infrastructure investment, which includes
more than one capital stock in the model.
4.1 A simple Ramsey model
To simplify the illustration, we take advantage of the Ramsey growth model equipped
with a logarithm utility function and a linear production technology. The society￿ s
intertemporal welfare is expressed as w0 =
R 1
0 ln(c(t))exp(￿￿t)dt, and the stock
dynamics by _ k(t) = ￿k(t) ￿ c(t); with initial stock k(0) = k0 > 0, and productivity
level ￿ > 0. Conditional on a given ￿, the optimal time path for consumption,
investment and capital can be derived, respectively, as c￿(t) = ￿k0e(￿￿￿)t, i￿(t) =
k0(￿ ￿ ￿)e(￿￿￿)t and k￿(t) = k0e(￿￿￿)t, and their corresponding prices are p￿(t) =
1
￿k0e￿(￿￿￿)t, q￿(t) = 1
￿k0e￿(￿￿￿)t, and s￿(t) = ￿
￿
￿k0e￿(￿￿￿)t. Note that the consumption
and investment prices are the same here in this one-sector model with a homogenous,
all-purpose good.
Now, we introduce a small project, a shift in productivity with d￿ > 0, for a ￿nite
period of time [0,T]. We want to "evaluate" it using the three propositions, although
the welfare e⁄ect in this example is obviously positive. The aim with this exercise
is to show how the various e⁄ects should be handled for a given evaluation criterion,
and how the envelope theorem can facilitate the process.
The direct perturbations of the project, as compared to the usual path, are d~ {(t) =
@ _ k(t)
@￿ d￿ = k￿(t) ￿ d￿ = k0e(￿￿￿)td￿ and d~ c(t) = 0, for t 2 [0;T]. To apply the envelope
result from proposition 3, it su¢ ces to calculate the present discounted value of these














Suppose that ￿ = 0:05, ￿ = 0:10, and du = 0:01, and T = 10. Then the welfare
change from (16) becomes dw0 ￿ 0:63 > 0, indicating, as expected, that the "project"
is welfare improving.
Next, let us try to apply proposition 2, a result based on the notation of net social
pro￿t. Here, we need to calculate the overall changes in consumption, investment
and capital, caused by the project, including all possible e⁄ects. By solving for the
alternative path based on the after-project productivity level ￿0 = ￿ + du, and com-
paring it with the original path conditional on the pre-project level ￿, we ￿nd that the




e(￿￿￿)t, ￿i(t) = k0
￿￿
(u0 ￿ ￿)e￿u￿t ￿ (u ￿ ￿)
￿￿
e(￿￿￿)t,




e(￿￿￿)t, are valid for the reform period t 2 [0;T]. For this
part of the analysis, the di⁄erences after the project period are not needed. Using





































Inserting the same parameter values above, the expression from (17) gives a nu-
merical value dw0 ￿ 0:66 > 0, extremely close to that from (16), in spite of its
roundaboutsness The deviation from (16) would vanish if the project du could be
reduced so as to be in￿nitesimal.
Finally, let us illustrate the application of proposition 1. In order to do this, we
also need to predict the overall change in consumption beyond the project period,




e(￿￿￿)t for t > T. The present discounted value of the
























12which ends up with exactly the same solution as in (17). It can now be seen that
all three propositions give, in principle, the same results although the envelope result
from proposition 3 is much simpler. The major complication with proposition 1 is
that it needs consumption data over an in￿nite horizon, and the di¢ culty associated
with proposition 2 lies in its involvement of multiple e⁄ects in investment and capital.
4.2 The Brock growth model
Here we consider a modi￿ed Ramsey growth model with pollution (Brock, 1977)
based on more general utility and production functions. The planner￿ s objective is to





subject to _ k = f(k;e) ￿ c ￿ g(￿) and _ x = e ￿ ￿(￿)x with k(0) = k0 and x(0) = x0
(cf. Aronsson et al,1997). Here c denotes consumption and x the stock of pollution.
Both a⁄ect the instantaneous utility, u(c;x), the variable e represents the emission
of pollutant and k the physical capital stock. Both of these enter the production
function. In the pre-project situation, the investment in cleaning technology, g(￿),
is assumed to be zero, and the assimilative capacity of the natural environment is a
constant ￿(￿0). Now, to evaluate a small investment project d￿ > 0 with g0(￿) > 0
and ￿0(￿) > 0 for all t ￿ 0, we can apply the dynamic cost-bene￿t rule in (15) such












then, the project is said to be socially pro￿table. Here @H￿=@￿is the partial derivative
of the present value Hamiltonian with respect to ￿, evaluated along the optimal path,
and ￿(t) < 0 is the shadow price of the stock of emissions. In monetary terms, we















13where ￿ ￿(t) = ￿(t)=￿(t) corresponds to the willingness-to-pay for a marginal reduction
in the pollution stock. Note that only the direct or partial e⁄ects of the project are
included here in the dynamic cost-bene￿t rule. This is because all other indirect or
induced e⁄ects on consumption, investment, emission, and changes in the two types
of capital stocks are canceled along the conditional ( ￿ = ￿0) optimal trajectory.
4.3 Infrastructure investment
In this ￿nal example, we consider a growth model in which infrastructure investment
may have a direct e⁄ect on consumption when this is de￿ned in a broader sense so
as to include leisure and recreation. The intertemporal welfare is formulated as w0 =
R 1
0 u(c;l;x)exp(￿￿t)dt, and the stock dynamics equation are _ k = f(k;z)￿c￿b(a) and
_ z = a￿￿z;where c is the usual consumption, k represents capital and z infrastructure,
say, the road net. For notational ease, we assume that only capital and the road net
enter the production function either without labor input or with a ￿xed amount of
labor. Thus, an infrastructure investment da would directly a⁄ect leisure through
l = l(a), l0(a) < 0 as well as the environmental service through x = x(a), x0(a) < 0.
To build a new road or improve an old one with da(t) at each year requires resource
k and labor input.
The business-as-usual case is a ￿xed, non-optimized stock of the road net with
z = z0. Road maintenance simply compensates the depreciation such that a0 =
rz0. Now, suppose that the government plans an active road investment project










= [￿b0(a)da(t);da(t)], at year t, t 2 [0;T]. The direct change
in comprehensive NNP at year t thus becomes
￿NNP(t) = p
￿
l(t)d~ l(t) + p
￿






where the p:s and the q:s denote the consumption and investment prices for the







14For more on the technical details of the dynamic Envelope Theorem, see Seierstad
(1982).
5 Concluding remarks
We started out with a string of questions. Most of them, we hope all, have been
answered by Propositions 1-3. The overall answer is that a cost-bene￿t rule under
a ￿rst-best-like setting can be formulated in many di⁄erent ways. In Proposition
1, we show that the present value of the change in consumption from time zero to
in￿nity is one answer, albeit a little impractical. In Proposition 2, we show that it
can be rewritten as the present value of social pro￿t over the project period. The
two propositions are di⁄erent sides of the same coin. The social pro￿t concept can
be further simpli￿ed by making use of the fact that certain envelope properties (￿rst
order conditions) hold over the project period. The cost of holding capital term now
disappears, since the cost of holding capital is exactly o⁄set by the bene￿t it would
have generated. After having canceled out all indirect e⁄ects, we are, in Proposition
3, left with a linear index consisting of the present value of the direct e⁄ects on the
comprehensive NNP (or the Hamiltonian) over the project period; i.e. whether it is
a utility or money metrics does not matter. This is by far the most practical way of
approaching project evaluation.
We have also provided a few stylized examples to illustrate our theory. It is
demonstrated that the envelope results can greatly facilitate cost-bene￿t analysis of
small projects, provided that the conditional optimum path assumptions hold. It
is also worth mentioning that the main results presented in this paper can also be
derived by starting from a much more general stochastic multi-sector growth model,
using the envelope properties embedded in the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
The deterministic Envelope Theorem and our proposition 3 would then surface as a
special case.
6 Appendix
In this appendix, we show how to arrive at the "net social pro￿t" notion of the cost-
bene￿t rule. By taking the total di⁄erential of the optimal value function in (11) with














































Since the equality constraint I(￿) = _ K(￿) always binds, the last term in the integrand
of (19) vanishes. To simplify the formula, we integrate the term ￿￿(￿;t)￿@ _ K￿=@￿￿d￿














































where S(￿;t) = _ ￿(￿;t)￿￿￿(￿;t) is the cost of holding capital during an in￿nitesimal
period, dt. The second equality follows from the initial condition with K(0) ￿xed and








































In fact, the expression in (21) can be greatly simpli￿ed by using the dynamic envelope
theorem which eliminates all indirect e⁄ects. To ￿x ideas, however, we simplify the
expression in two steps in order to better understand the rationale under the dynamic
cost-bene￿t rule. First, we attempt to reduce the integral in (21) from an in￿nite time
horizon to a ￿nite time interval [0,T], during which the project being carried out. Since
the necessary conditions @U￿=@C+￿￿@I￿=@C = 0 and S￿ = _ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ = ￿@H￿=@K
16hold along the conditional optimal trajectory with a given ￿ = ￿0, and the direct
e⁄ects of an investment project are only con￿ned within the project period t 2 [0;T]
with @￿=@￿ = 0 and @I￿=@￿ = 0 for all t > T, the part of the integral from time T













































￿(t)￿K(t)] ￿ ￿(t) ￿ e
￿￿tdt
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